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Abstract
Information disclosure is an important aspect of a company’s governance policy, affect-
ing investor’s decision-making and firm value. The purpose of this study is to estimate
the effect of information disclosed on firm value for firms in the Integrated Latin Amer-
ican Market (MILA) countries over the period 2011-2017. We use Structural Equations
Modelling (SEM), where our latent variable “Disclosure Quality” is measured using five
textual analysis variables as indicators. We find a positive and statistically significant effect
of “Disclosure Quality” on Firm Value.
Key words: Information asymmetry; disclosure; firm value; textual analysis; structural equa-
tions modelling; SEM
JEL Classification: D82; G32; C38
∗MSc in Finance student (Universidad EAFIT), Medellin. lfrestrepc@eafit.edu.co
2
1 Introduction
Information disclosure is an important aspect of a company’s governance policy, this affects
the investor’s decision-making, asset prices and, in turn, the firm value. When companies
commit to higher levels of disclosure, this reduces the possibility of information asymmetry
between the company and its shareholders (Leuz and Verrecchia, 1999) also reducing the costs
involved. Consequently, a firm’s disclosure policy influences the amount of information con-
tained in stock returns (Haggard et al., 2008), risk and firm value.
A substantial literature in accounting and finance has focused on information disclosure issues.
There is an important strand of disclosure literature that explores the role of disclosure prac-
tices on firm variables (Banghoj and Plenborg, 2008; Botosan, 1997; Brown and Hillegeist,
2007; Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017; Hassan, 2018). The analytical foundation of these studies is
the proposal that greater disclosure reduces information asymmetry. Diamond (1985) seminal
study shows that the information disclosure policy improves the well-being of investors due to
the reduction of information costs and the reduction of risk-sharing. Subsequently, Diamond
and Verrecchia (1991) state that higher levels of disclosure lead to a reduction in information
asymmetry between managers and investors. In the same vein, Easley and O’hara (2004) argue
that investors demand higher returns when information is private, so the higher the disclosure,
the greater the amount of public information and the lower the risk of investors owning a share.
Although several studies show substantial economic benefits from disclosure, there is little un-
derstanding of emerging markets (Chauhan and Kumar, 2018), including Latin American. Most
studies related to information disclosure focus on the U.S. market, where the variation in dis-
closure levels is not large because mandatory disclosure is already high (Lopes and de Alencar,
2010). Following the theory of agency costs, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which establishes
the consequences of agency costs on firm value, the characteristics of Latin American mar-
kets such as high information asymmetry and ownership concentration magnify the impact of
agency costs. This makes it particularly interesting to evaluate the effect of corporate gover-
nance policies as disclosure in these markets.
Furthermore, given that in a scenario of high information asymmetry, the effect of corporate
governance practices is greater, a vulnerable investor environment in Latin American coun-
tries creates an opportunity for firms to differentiate from others (Garay and González, 2008).
Hence, the economic consequences of information disclosure on firm value are particularly
important in a region characterized by high levels of information asymmetry as Latin Amer-
ica where it is more likely to observe a high disclosure level variation (Lopes and de Alencar,
2010). In this regard, empirical evidence on the impact of disclosure policies in Latin American
markets has found positive effects (González et al., 2019).
In this sense, a Latin American market as MILA, created in 2010 seeking integration and diver-
sification of the Latin American region and currently the most important center of investment
in Latin America (MILA, 2017), is interesting to explore the effects of information disclosure
over high levels of information asymmetry, since the purposes under which this market was
created depend primarily on liquidity and transaction costs, which are in fact directly affected
by information asymmetry and therefore by disclosure.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of disclosure on firm value for firms in MILA
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over the period 2011-2017. We estimate the effect of disclosure on firm value using Structural
Equations Modelling (SEM), where our latent variable “Disclosure Quality” is measured using
five textual analysis variables.
2 Information Disclosure and Firm Value
The main mechanism by which information disclosure affects firm value is by reducing the in-
formation asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders. The role of information asymmetry
in the investor decision making is a critical issue for market efficiency, as investors with differ-
ent levels of information face different price curves that lead to information asymmetry being
reflected in prices (Armstrong et al., 2011). Also, environments of high information asymmetry
lead to estimation and valuation errors from investors when assessing investment opportunities.
These problems related to investor decisions in information asymmetry environments affect the
price of the firm. Easley and O’hara (2004) find that private information leads to higher returns
demanded by investors who have an informational disadvantage and higher estimation risk.
This type of investor drives down the price of securities with greater information asymmetry.
In summary, this reflects important economic consequences of information asymmetry, such as
the increased risk of investors holding stocks and inaccurate investor estimates that affect their
decisions and behavior about a firm.
Nonetheless, there are different ways to reduce these consequences of information asymme-
try through disclosure. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) states that greater levels of disclosure
reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors due to increased liquidity of
securities. On the other hand, Diamond (1985) shows that the information disclosure policy
improves the well-being of the investor since information costs and risk sharing implied by in-
formation asymmetry are reduced. Empirically, Greenstein and Sami (1994) provide evidence
about the negative association between the level of disclosure and information asymmetry.
They find that bid-ask spread proxy for information asymmetry is reduced with higher segment
disclosure.
The above supports the idea that corporate information disclosure reduces estimation risks and
improves the valuation accuracy of investors. As Chauhan and Kumar (2018) state, the benefits
of corporate disclosure come from the fact that investors can access information that allows
them to assess the companys profitability in different time periods, which enhances valuation
accuracy and then, the returns on investments. Consequently, the benefits of information dis-
closure are directly reflected in firm cash flows and cost of capital, which are fundamental
determinants of firm value (Damodaran, 2012). First, a higher corporate disclosure can influ-
ence firm value directly through pure cashflow effects by reducing agency costs (Lang et al.,
2003). Second, information disclosure reduces a firm cost of capital (Mangena et al., 2016;
Schreder, 2018) through the reduction of estimation risks that implies a lower rate of return
required by investors (Lambert et al., 2007), improving firm value.
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between disclosure and firm value suggests a
positive association. Examining whether corporate environmental disclosure affects firm value
using a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies from 2010 to 2015, Hassan (2018) finds a
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positive and significant relationship. Likewise, Chauhan and Kumar (2018) study the effect of
non-financial disclosure on firm value for Indian firms and find a positive relationship. They at-
tribute this result to lower cost of funds and higher operating cash flow due to disclosure. Also,
for Latin American countries, Garay et al. (2013) and González et al. (2019), examine the ef-
fect of corporate disclosure index on firm value for Latin American stock markets and find that
there is a positive association. Given these positive valuation effects associated with different
measures of disclosure, as Patel et al. (2002) suggest, this evidence is consistent with the idea
that there is a market premium on companies with lower asymmetric information. Therefore,
better practices of information disclosure benefit a firm by increasing its value through the re-
duction of information asymmetry that reduces the cost of capital and enhances cash flows.
Table 2.1 Common Measures of Disclosure in Empirical
Literature
Authors Disclosure Index
Chauhan & Kumar (2018) Bloomberg Score
Hassan ( 2018) Bloomberg Score
Patel et al. (2002) Annual Report Attributes
Botosan & Plumlee (2002) Annual Report Attributes
Garay et al. (2013) Internet Attributes
Gonzles et al. (2019) Anual Report/Internet Attributes
Lang et al. (2012) Financial Variables
The main challenge in this study is to measure the quality of information disclosed. Since the
firm’s level of disclosure is not directly observable, it is necessary to use proxy variables to
measure it. In the empirical literature, such as the studies we listed above, the most common
methodology is proxy disclosure using an index based on a checklist of items contained in
annual reports. In Table 1.1 we have examples of different indexes used to measure disclo-
sure. González et al. (2019) and Garay et al. (2013) built indexes as a checklist of information
available on the firm’s annual reports and the internet corporate web page for Latin American
firms. Also, other indexes built on annual reports information are found in Patel et al. (2002)
and Botosan and Plumlee (2002).
Differently from that approach, we measure information disclosure not from the quantity dis-
closed using indexes but from the quality of information captured by textual variables. Infor-
mation disclosure measured merely as a quantity does not capture aspects beyond how much
information is disclosed. It is important to characterize the information disclosed in order to
capture the signaling effect of information and its true impact on stakeholders. We argue that
some textual and language characteristics of the president’s letter section in annual reports re-
flect the quality of information disclosed by the firm. Thus, we propose to measure the quality
of information disclosed as a latent variable “Disclosure Quality” that is manifest in textual
measures, given that the way a firm sends information to its shareholders is reflected in what is
said and how it is said. To capture the quality aspects of information disclosed we use textual
analysis techniques that allow us to capture different features related to the text, the language
used and intention of information contained in annual reports.
Textual analysis is a relatively new area in accounting and finance (Loughran and Mcdonald,
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2016) and it typically focuses on using computational resources to extract meaning from a
set of texts. It is considered a subset of qualitative analysis. Some studies in accounting and
finance using textual analysis methods to examine the impact of qualitative information on eq-
uity valuations are Antweiler and Frank (2004); Frazier et al. (1984); Tetlock (2007). To the
best of our knowledge, studies related to disclosure and firm value (Chauhan and Kumar, 2018;
Garay et al., 2013; Hassan, 2018; Patel et al., 2002) have not focused on examining narrative
content to proxy disclosure, but on checking whether the reports contain certain financial and
accounting information or information related to other corporate areas, these studies have not
implemented textual measures to capture textual aspects that lead to a characterization of the
content of interest. Nevertheless, González et al. (2019) characterize the information disclosed
by Latin American firms using language textual measures, in this line, this is the closest re-
search to our work, which argue that the tone is a language feature of information disclosed
that affects firm value.
Considering the above, our input to measure the company “Disclosure Quality” in this research
is the text from the presidents’ letter section in the firm’s annual report. Unlike most studies
that examine the information content of financial statements, and more related to studies such
as Abrahamson and Amir (1996) and González et al. (2019), we focus on the president’s letter
section of the annual report. Since the president’s letter section is a narrative portion of the an-
nual report that contains the presidents perspectives and opinions on the firm current and future
performance, we intend to capture relevant non-financial and voluntary information. Based
on this information, we use Cosine Similarity, Readability, Positive and Negatives tones and
Length textual analysis variables to extract the quality of information disclosed and infer the
latent variable “Disclosure Quality”. Then, given the latent nature of our variable of interest,
we estimate the effect of disclosure on firm value using a SEM Methodology that enables us to
explore the relationships between latent and observed variables.
We contribute to extending the literature on the consequences of increased disclosure on emerg-
ing markets by providing empirical evidence useful for policy design about market transparency
and disclosure levels that depends on firm incentives related to value. Furthermore, we con-
tribute as we use a different methodology based on textual analysis techniques to measure
disclosure level and structural equations model to estimate the relationship between disclosure
and firm value. Our findings on the quality of information disclosed in the president’s letter
give important insights to explore the effects of narrative informatio on the firm value.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In the Data and Methodology section, we describe
the sample, the control, dependent and independent variables, the textual analysis we perform
and the SEM model. In the Results section, we report the estimations obtained and discussion
of them. Finally, we summarize and conclude.
3 Data and Methodology
MILA is a Latin American market created in 2010 seeking integration and diversification of
the Latin American region and currently is the most important center of investment in Latin
America (MILA, 2017). Figure 2.1 shows the market capitalization of markets in MILA as
September 2017. The largest markets are Mexico and Chile followed by Colombia and Peru.
MILA Market is an important investment center in Latin America that has great diversifica-
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tion and also, an important potential for the creation of new business and commercial relations
(MILA, 2017). Thus, the academic interest in this market has grown and has been mainly fo-
cused on the analysis of integration and market dynamics (e.g., Barari, 2004; Espinosa-Méndez
et al., 2017; Mellado and Escobari, 2015).
Figure 3.1: Market Capitalization MILA Markets (Billion USD)
Source: MILA, 2017
The current study aims to examine the effect of information disclosure on firm value for firms
in MILA. For this purpose, we start with the list of firms registered in MILA by country. Then,
we hand-collect the annual reports for each firm during the period spanning 2010 to 2017. The
source for the compilation of the annual reports was the website of the stock exchanges of each
country and the websites of the companies. We start the period of study in 2011 as MILA
began to operate in this year. We use the annual reports to, mainly, construct our text measures.
We then complete our database with financial information from other sources such Bloomberg
and Eikon. Due to lack of financial information for some companies, some annual reports were
excluded from the total sample of 1631 annual reports. Then, our final sample is composed of
1412 observations representing 198 firms from which we were able to get annual reports and
financial information required. For the analysis of textual variables, we take into account the
entire sample of 1631 annual reports.
In Table 2.1 we have sample observations by country. Chile and Mexico are the countries with
the greatest contribution as this are the greatest markets of MILA. With 48% of participation,
observations from Chile composes almost half of complete sample, followed by Mexico with
22%, and Peru and Colombia which have the lowest contribution with 17% and 14% respec-
tively.
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Table 3.1 Sample by Country
Country Freq. Percent Cum.
Chile 674 47.73 47.73
Mexico 311 22.03 69.76
Peru 233 16.5 86.26
Colombia 194 13.74 100
Total 1,412 100
In Table 2.2 we have observations by sector. Sector data was collected from Economatica
database. We get The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code as it is a
much more consistent indicator of a company industry. Most companies of the sample are from
Manufacturing Industry and Financial and Insurance Services with 27% and 25% respectively.
Other relevant sectors in the sample are those related to utilities, mining and retail, which are
less than and equal to 10% of sample. For further analysis of variables by sector, only these
five representative sectors are taken into account.
Table 3.2 Sample by Sector
Sector Freq. Percent Cum.
Manufacturing Industries 380 26.91 26.91
Financial and Insurance Services 351 24.86 51.77
Electricity, Gas and Water Companies 148 10.48 62.25
Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction 101 7.15 69.41
Retail Trade 96 6.8 76.2
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 69 4.89 81.09
Construction 64 4.53 85.62
Transport, Post and Warehousing 55 3.9 89.52
Information in Mass Media 38 2.69 92.21
Corporate 24 1.7 93.91
Real Estate and Rental Services of Movable and Intangible Property 24 1.7 95.61
Health and Social Services 23 1.63 97.24
Cultural and Sporting Recreation and Other Recreational Services 16 1.13 98.37
Wholesale Trade 10 0.71 99.08
Temporary Accommodation and Food and Beverage Preparation Services 7 0.5 99.58
Business Support Services and Waste and Waste Management, and Remediation Services 6 0.42 100
Total 1,412 100
3.1 Dependent Variable
Given that our variable of interest is the firm value, we use Tobin’s Q as it is the common
variable used in the literature to measure firm value. Several studies related to firm value use
Tobin’s Q, some examples are studies that as well as we seek to measure the effects of corporate
governance practices on firm value (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). Tobin’s
Q is measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (La Porta et al.,
2002). Given that low average liquidity of Latin American markets can make Tobin’s Q less
informative (Garay et al., 2013), we also use ROA as a robustness test to our model. ROA is
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measured as the ratio of firm’s Net Income to Total Assets.
3.2 Independent Variables
We propose to measure disclosure through the variable “Disclosure Quality” which is a non ob-
servable variable. In this work we argue that the quality of information disclosed is manifested
in textual features of information disclosed, textual and language characteristics of president’s
letter section in annual reports reflects the quality of what a firm disclose. The way a firm sends
information to its shareholders is reflected in what is said and how it is said. To measure the
contribution of textual features on the quality of information disclosed, we use five textual mea-
sures, Similarity, Readability, Positive and Negative tones, and Length. We use this indicators
because they allow us to characterize the type of text contained in the president’s letter from
text size, language attributes and differences in information disclosed from year to year.
First, we use Similarity also known as Cosine Similarity. This is a measure for narrative dis-
closure introduced by Brown and Tucker (2011). This measure allows us to capture the degree
by which the president’s letter section differs from the previous year using Vector Space Model
(VSM) methodology. The Vector Space Model represents a document as a vector in an n-
dimensional Euclidean space, where n is the number of unique words in all documents in the
sample and the value of each vector element is the frequency of a particular word in that docu-
ment Brown and Tucker (2011). With the vectors for each document, we calculate the similarity
score which is measured as the angle between the two vectors representing the documents.
Suppose the sample has n unique words. Each document is represented as a n-dimension vector.
The Similarity Score or Cosine Measure is defined as:











v1 is the vector for document 1 and v2 is the vector for document 2.
θ is the angle between v1 and v2
‖v1‖ and ‖v2‖ are the vector length of v1 and v2 respectively
The score is bounded between 0 and 1, with a higher score indicating more similarity.
Second, we use the FLesch-Szigriszt Readability Index (IFSZ) for Spanish texts proposed by
Szigriszt (1993). The score is bounded between 0 and 100, where a value between 0-50 indi-
cates that the text is difficult; between 55-65 is normal and a score higher than 70 indicates that
the text is easy.





Where, S it the total number of syllables, P the total number of words and F the total number
of phrases.
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Third, we use word content analysis to define positive and negative language in the President’s
letter section of the annual report. We use the positive and negative dictionaries for Spanish
proposed by González et al. (2019). The procedure is to search inside the document for a list
of words “bags of words” that are likely to be associated with positive and negative language.






wt f .id fi j (3.3)
Where, a is the total number of words in document i, wt f .id fi j is the weight of each term in the
document and J is the total number of words.
Finally, we include Length. This is a textual measure that is built from the word count of a text.
Following Loughran and Mcdonald (2014) argument, that traditional measures of readability
like the Fog Index are poorly specified in financial applications, we add Length as a measure
of robustness for readability since the authors propose to measure readability with the file size
which they show is a good proxy.
Length = Length(Text) (3.4)
3.3 Control Variables
We follow the literature and propose the following control variables to our model setting. Firm
Size is measured as the logarithm of total revenue. Firm size is expected to be positively
associated with firm value indicating a size effect by which larger firms have higher Tobin’s Q
(Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). Leverage is expected to have a negative effect on firm value as high
levels of leverage are expected to have underinvestment consequences (Myers, 1977). Growth
Opportunities is measured as the growth rate of revenue, and it is negatively associated with
firm value following the argument given by Myers and Majluf (1984) by which firms with high
growth opportunities have greater levels of information asymmetry.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned above, the annual reports of the companies that make up our sample are the input
for the calculation of the textual measures that we use in this study. The annual reports referred
to here are those documents in which a company reports on its annual performance, not specific
regulatory financial reports. The annual reports are generally composed of information related
to all relevant areas of the company such as finance, risks, social responsibility, environment,
etc., reporting the main results and expectations on the issues surrounding these areas. We are
particularly interested in the section of the document where the president of the company gives
a message to the shareholders. This section is usually named Letter to shareholders or the Pres-
ident’s message.
Different names are used to refer to the annual reports containing the president’s letter, de-
pending on the country. In Chile and Peru, these reports are by the name “Memoria Anual” in
Colombia “Informe de gestión” and in Mexico “Informe Anual”. In most cases, these reports
are not mandatory, as are the specific financial reports that are reported to each country’s regu-
latory bodies. This is one limitation of our sample data, not all companies share annual reports
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that are not exclusively mandatory.
For the collection of annual reports, we had to access different web pages as required. For
companies registered on the Chilean stock exchange, the website of the financial market com-
mission (www.cmfchile.cl) contains the annual reports of each company. By searching for
the name of the company we accessed all the registered information of the company and also
to the section “Memoria Anual” from where we downloaded the annual reports. For compa-
nies registered on the Peruvian stock exchange, on the page of the stock exchange of Lima
(www.bvl.com.pe) when looking for a company name, in the section “Información Corpora-
tiva” we find the associated annual memories. In the case of Colombia and Mexico, for compa-
nies registered on the stock exchanges, it was necessary to access one by one to the web pages
of the companies since these reports are not consolidated in a single source as in the case of
Chile and Peru. Mexico’s stock exchange web page contains only financial regulatory reports.
Table 3.3 Number of words by country
Country Mean Min Max Number of reports
Chile 1071 158 4342 836
Mexico 1167 179 4618 323
Peru 1180 64 4372 237
Colombia 1709 124 4795 235
Total 1631
Figure 3.2: Number of words by country
Note: Histograms of the number of words in the president’s
letter grouped by country. For each histogram, dashed lines
represents the mean of number of words in annual reports.
In Table 2.3 we have descriptive statistics of president’s letters by country. Although Colombia
and Peru are the countries that contribute the least to the sample of reports, they have the highest
average words with reports containing an average of 1180 and 1709 words. Chile is the country
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that contribute the most to the sample of annual reports with 836 reports. Average number of
words in Chile reports is 1071 words. The smallest annual report in our sample has 64 words
and is from Peru and the largest annual report with 4795 words if from Colombia. In Figure 2.2
we have histograms of number of words in annual reports by country. In general, the annual
reports do not have a standard size per country, the number of words varies in a considerable
range of words. Colombia’s reports have the lower variation compared to the other countries.
The descriptive statistics for the financial and textual variables are give in Table 2.4. The input
to calculate textual measures is the text of the president’s letter in annual reports. Textual mea-
sures are obtained building text vectors where each text from each year and each firm is taken
as a particular document.
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Min Max S.D.
Firm Value 1352 1.35 0.25 9.01 0.83
Similarity 1189 0.16 0.01 0.84 0.11
Positive 1412 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.01
Negative 1412 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01
Readability 1411 53.13 0.00 90.34 9.32
Length 1412 1241 64 4926 821
ROA 1264 0.07 -0.72 1.19 0.09
Size 1379 9.68 -3.22 18.07 3.60
Growth 1211 0.21 -1.00 91.96 2.89
Leverage 1384 1.89 0.00 50.29 3.01
Regarding the financial variables, for firm value (Tobin’s Q) we have a mean of 1.35 and a mean
of 0.07 for ROA. On average, the firms from our sample have a leverage of 1.89 and a sales
growth ratio (Growth) of 0.21. About the textual measures we have that the average similarity
is 0.16, since Similarity is bounded between 0 and 1 , 0.16 means a relatively low repetition in
annual reports from one year to another. For Positive we have low levels that are not beyond
12% with a mean of 4%. Also, for Negative we have low levels as values are not beyond 7%,
with a lower mean of 2%. Readability has in average a value of 53.13, since this measure is
bounded between 0 and 100, 53.13 means normal readability in the scale of this score, that is
a text that is neither too easy nor too difficult to understand. Finally, for Length we have that
in average the president’s letter section have 1241 words, the smallest letter have 64 words and
the largest 4926.
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Figure 3.3: Similarity by Country
Note: Similarity is measured in pairs of years, indicating how similar an annual
report is to the annual report of the immediately preceding year. i.e., 2011 sim-
ilarity is the similarity between 2010 and 2011 annual report. Similarity vales
are between 0 and 1.
Figure 3.4: Similarity by year
Note: Similarity is measured in pairs of years, indicating how similar an annual report is to
the annual report of the immediately preceding year. i.e., 2011 similarity is the similarity
between 2010 and 2011 annual report. Similarity vales are between 0 and 1.
In Figure 2.3 and 2.4 we have histograms of Similarity. By country and year respectively.
Colombia and Mexico annual reports present highest values of similarity reaching 0.8 but this
are not representative values. For the four countries we have a general concentration of simi-
larity around values near 0.1 and 0.2. which represents a low level of similarity between two
annual reports. Peru shows greater variation of similarity with values of similarity around 0.05
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and 0.4. About the similarity by year, the highest values of similarity reaching 0.8 are present
in years 2012, 2013 and 2016. For each year, representative values of similarity are around 0.1
and 0.2. This means that in general, a specific year annual report is as similar to its immediately
last annual report in 10% and 20% of the content.
Figure 3.5: Readability by Country
Note: Readability values ranging from 0 to 100.
In Figure 2.5 we have histograms of Readability by country. The average readability by country
is 52.73, 51.65, 52.43, 56.52, for Chile, Colombia Mexico and Peru respectively. This values
are placed in the normal readability of readability scale, which means that the presidents letters
from the four countries are neither too easy nor too difficult to understand.
In Figure 2.6 and 2.7 we have words frequency by country and sector respectively. Regarding
the words frequency by country, we have the ten most frequents words in president’s letter for
each country. There are several words that are common in the four countries, the words ”ac-
cionistas”, ”crecimiento” and ”resultados” are common in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru
president’s letters. About the words frequency by sector, we have the five most representative
sectors in our sample, this is, Electricity, Gas and Water Companies (1), Financial and Insur-
ance Services (2), Manufacturing Industries (8),Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction
(14), and Retail Trade (10). The word ”crecimiento” is common to president’s letter in sectors
2, 8, 10 and 14. Also, the word ”clientes” is common to president’s letter in sectors 1, 2 and 10.
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Figure 3.6: Words Frequency by Country
Note: Ten most common words in president’s letter
from Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Figure 3.7: Words Frequency by Sector
Note: Five most common words in president’s letter by sector. Electricity, Gas
and Water Companies(1), Financial and Insurance Services(2), Manufacturing
Industries(8), Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction(14), and Retail
Trade(10).
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3.5 Structural Equations Model
As stated earlier, given the unobservable nature of our variable of interest, “Disclosure Quality”,
we use Structural Equations Modelling (SEM) to estimate the relationship between “Disclosure
Quality” and firm value. Structural equations models are a family of multivariate statistical
models that allow us to estimate the effect and relationships between multiple variables, in-
cluding latent constructs or not directly observable variables. Structural equations modelling
accounts for the relationships between observed and latent variables in different types of theo-
retical models, which provide a quantitative test of a hypothesis established (Lomax and Schu-
macker, 2004). SEM models combines regression, factorial analysis, and analysis of variance
for simultaneously estimating interrelated dependency relationships.
Three features that characterize Structural Equation Models (Hair et al., 2006) are:
• Estimation of multiple and interrelated dependence relationships
• The ability to represent unobserved concepts in these relationships and correct the mea-
surement errors in the estimation process.
• Defining model to explain the entire set of relationships
Thus, this methodology allows us to formulate hypotheses about how sets of variables defining
constructs and how they relate to each other and explicitly take measurement error into account
(Lomax and Schumacker, 2004). In this sense, we are able to analyze latent and observed
variables with their associated measurement error terms, so we can test whether our disclo-
sure hypothesised model is supported by sample data. Relying on this properties, to address
both, the simultaneity of regression equations and the estimation issues of the unobserved la-
tent factor “Disclosure Quality” we follow the Anderson and Gerbing (1988) general model of
two-step modelling. This SEM approach consists of a measurement and a structural model.
3.6 Measurement Model
The measurement model is a confirmatory factor model which results from Confirmatory Fac-
tor Analysis (CFA). This analysis requires an specific theoretical background for our latent
variable ”Disclosure Quality”, but in the absence of this, we use the confirmatory factor model
in an exploratory manner (Long, 1983). In this model we specify how the latent factors or con-
structs are related to the observed variables. Factor analysis attempts to explain the variation
and covariation in a set of observed variables in terms of a set of unobserved factors (Long,
1983). The factors are of two types, common factors that may directly affect more than one of
the observed variables and unique or residual factors that may directly affect only one observed
variable (Long, 1983), the error term.
In our measurement model we establish one latent factor “Disclosure Quality” common to
five observed variables or indicators , Similarity, Readability, Positive and Negative tones and
Length which are defined as we mentioned before. Mathematically, for each indicator we have
the following equation indicating its relationship with the factor:
yi = λik ηk + εi (3.5)
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Where,
yi is the observed indicator, λik is the factor loading for the i measured variable predicted by
the factor k, ηk is the latent variable k and εi is the residual.
The error term contains information about systematic variance unique to each indicator and
random measurement error (Newsom, 2015). The latent variable variance is derived from the
variances and covariances of the observed variables. The covariance matrix is descomposed
into the matrices of loadings, factor variances and measurement residuals (Newsom, 2015).
Var(yi) = λ 2ik Var(ηk)+Var(εi) (3.6)





For each equation, Var(εi) = θii and Var(ηk) = Ψkk
3.7 Structural Model
The structural model is the general model where we get together the measurement and the
regression model. The structural model we propose to estimate in Figure 2.8. contains one
measurement model for “Disclosure Quality” with indicators Similarity, Readability, Positive
and Negative tones, and Length. Also, we have one regression model to infer the relation-
ship between Firm Value and the latent construct “Disclosure Quality”, including the control
variables, Size, Leverage and Growth. In SEM convention is usual to use circles to represent
“Latent” variables and squares to represent “Observed”.
For the estimation of the model factor loadings, path coefficients and residual variances, we
need maximum likelihood estimates. In the estimation of the SEM model the purpose is to









log(xi−µi)′ Σ−1i (xi−µi) (3.9)
Where,
The subscript i refers to the observed cases, xi to the variables observed for case i and µi and
Σi contain population means and covariances of the variables observed for case i.
The fit function in Equation 2.8 applies with clusters as units of observation, and individual
within clusters as variables (Hox et al., 2017). Also, allowing for incomplete data we estimate
using Full Maximum Likelihood asumming missing at random (MLR), which allows for ro-
bust chi-squares and standard errors to non normality. SEM estimation provides standardized
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Figure 3.8: Hypothesised Model of Disclosure Quality and Firm Value
estimates to consider variables that are measured in a different metric.
Regarding the goodness of fit, to asses how well the hypothetical model approximates the
sample data, we carefully have to consider jointly different goodness of fit measures available
in SEM, as Chi-square test, Akaike’s Information Criterion, the Comparative fit index (CFI),
Tucker Lewis index (TLI) and RMSEA.
4 Results and Discussion
Variables correlations are given in Table 3.1. First, we describe the correlations among the tex-
tual variables Similarity, Positive and Negative tones, Readability and Length with Firm Value.
For Similarity, Negative tone and Length we have a negative relationship with Firm Value.
Since high values of these indicators are a sign of poor quality disclosure, it is intuitively rea-
sonable for them to be negatively related to Firm Value, as explained next. About Similarity,
this is a measure of the similarity between two president letters of different but contiguous
years. For example, the similarity is basically the comparison between the textual contents of
2010 vs 2011 or 2011 vs 2012 president’s letters. A high value of this indicator means that we
have a low level of new information disclosed from one year to another and so, the two letters
are very similar which is a negative signal about the quality of information. On the Negative
tone, it’s not very clear, but as the percentage of Negative tone increase in a president letter we
have a signal of pessimism that can be misinterpreted by stakeholders, in this sense this might
be a negative feature of information but is not conclusive. About Length, this is a measure of
text size. As Length increase this could be a sign that the information in the president letter is
more filling information than relevant information about the firm. Also, very long texts can be
tedious for the reader and thus can affect the reader’s perception of relevant information.
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Following the same intuition, for Readability and Positive tone, we have a positive relationship
with Firm Value. Since these measures could be indicators of the good quality of the text,
this relates positively to firm value. About Readability, this measure allows us to examine the
complexity of a text. Increases in Readability could be interpreted as information easier to un-
derstand given the scale of measurement. But from a different point of view, as texts are easier
to read, the level of education required is lower which may be a sign that the text is not aimed
at a target audience like high education stakeholders and so, it is possible that information con-
tained in the president’s letter is not very informative. On the Positive tone, as the percentage
of Positive tone increase this could be interpreted as a signal of optimism that can be received
by stakeholders as a good signal although this might be a positive feature of information this is
not conclusive.
For Leverage and Growth, we have a negative association with firm value. Leverage is expected
to have a negative effect on firm value due to underinvestment problems (Fosu et al., 2016;
Myers, 1977) and Growth is expected to have a negative effect as firms with high growth op-
portunities have greater levels of information asymmetry that affects negatively the firm value
Myers and Majluf (1984). Size is positively related to firm value, this is a size effect by which
larger firms are high valued (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005).
Table 4.1 Variables Correlation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.Firm Value -
2.Similarity -0.037 -
3.Positive 0.024 -0.177* -
4.Negative -0.193* 0.028 -0.145* -
5.Readability 0.019 0.216* -0.262* 0.251* -
6.Lenght -0.078* 0.299* -0.193* 0.004 0.091* -
7.ROA 0.701* -0.009 0.076* -0.137* 0.050 -0.061* -
8.Size 0.096* -0.038 0.107* -0.132* -0.002 0.154* 0.127* -
9.Growth -0.013 0.011 -0.016 0.050 0.072* -0.006 -0.023 -0.065* -
10.Leverage -0.081* 0.103* 0.048 0.097* 0.055* 0.051 -0.109* 0.241* -0.020 -
∗p < .05
Without a specific theoretical basis for our latent variable ”Disclosure Quality”, as we stated
before, we propose five indicators to approximate the quality of information disclosed and thus,
our latent variable. In the first step, the measurement model, we estimated the confirmatory fac-
tor analysis model to determine how the Similarity, Positive, Negative, Readability and Length
indicators are empirically related to ”Disclosure Quality”. Then, in the second stage, we es-
timate the relationship between Dislocusre Quality and Firm Value in the SEM model. We
estimated CFA and SEM models using R program and (FIML) estimation which is a robust
estimate in the presence of missing values.
Regarding the first step estimations, the factor analysis (CFA), In Table 3.2 we have the results
for the measurement model. All of the textual variables are significant in explaining the vari-
ance of the Disclosure Quality factor. Similarity, Negative, Readability and Length variables
are negatively related to Disclosure Quality. The negative effect of Similarity suggests that
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higher values of similarity are signal of poor quality of the president’s letter as the similarity
between two different years letters means that a firm is not disclosing new information. The
negative effect of Readability may be read from the fact that higher levels of Readability show
that the level of education required to understand the information disclosed is not high. Thus,
the meaning of words used could not be targeted to specific public or shareholders which makes
this information less useful for them. The negative effect of Length may be capturing the fact
that the longer the texts, the more irrelevant information is likely to be included. Thus, a higher
extent of the president’s letter may be undervalued by shareholders. The effects of Positive and
Negative tones are not conclusive as this are textual features that cannot explicitly mean good
or bad quality, but as we stated before, them can serve as a sign of optimism and pessimism for
stakeholders.








∗p < .1 ∗∗p < .05 ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 4.3 Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Variables on
Firm Value




Negative -0.024 ** -0.024***
Readability -0,043 ** -0,043 ***




∗p < .1 ∗∗ p < .05 ∗∗∗p < .01
In Table 3.3 we have SEM estimations. The main interest of this research is the path from
Disclosure Quality to Firm Value. This path gives a positive relationship as we expected. A
coefficient of 0.080 suggests that for each standard deviation increase in disclosure quality, the
firm value increase by 0.080. This effect evidences that different features of information dis-
closed to shareholders are important for the firm valuation. Regarding control variables, Size is
positively related to firm value and significant as we expected. Growth and Leverage are nega-
tively related to firm value, but only Leverage is significant. In SEM methodology is possible
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to obtain indirect effects of indicators, Similarity, Positive, Negative, Readability and Length,
on Firm Value. Similarity, Negative, Readability and Length have a negative effect on Firm
Value and Positive is positively related to Firm Value.
Model fit indices are set in Table 3.4. For RMSEA and SRMR smaller values are better, and
for Chi-squared, CFI and TLI higher values are better.








As a test of robustness, we proposed to measure the firm value as the Roa of the company.
In the first step, the measurement model, we found that textual indicators have no significant
change, remain close to the initial estimates and maintain their signs and significance. In the
structural model, the control variables remain almost the same, but the effect of sales growth is
positive and significantly different from the initial estimates using Tobin’s Q as a measure of
the firm value. In this exercise, the goodness of fit measures improve.








∗p < .1. ∗∗p < .05. ∗∗∗ p < .01
6 Conclusions
Information disclosure is an important aspect of a company’s governance policy that affects the
investor’s decision-making and also the firm value. In this research, we estimate the effect of
disclosure on firm value for firms in MILA countries over the period 2011-2017. We use Struc-
tural Equations Modelling (SEM), where our latent variable “Disclosure Quality” is measured
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Table 5.2 Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Variables on
Firm Value




Negative -0.023 ** -0.023***
Readability -0,042 ** -0,042 ***




∗p < .1. ∗∗p < .05. ∗∗∗ p < .01







using five textual analysis variables as indicators. We find a positive and statistically significant
effect of the latent factor Disclosure Quality on Firm Value.
The indirect effects of textual variables on Firm Value are also captured. Similarity, Negative,
Readability and Length are negatively related to Firm Value and Positive is positively related.
In the exploratory analysis, we have significant effects of textual measures on Disclosure Qual-
ity. This evidence shows the importance of features related to information disclosed in the
quality of the information perceived by the shareholders and gives some light for policy issues
about information requirements that can enhance the firm’s perception.
The major limitation of this research is the exploratory fact of the indicators of Disclosure
Quality. Since there is no theoretical basis to support the choice of variables that signal the
quality of information disclosed we use factor analysis in an exploratory manner which leads
us to explore the relationship between the textual variables and Disclosure Quality but this can
represent specification issues. However, the relationships found in this research may be the path
to future research and provide a different perspective on the effects of the information disclosed
on the firm value.
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Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
Tobin′sQ =
Total Market Value o f Firm
Total Asset Value o f Firm
(A.1)






Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenue.
Size = Ln(Revenue) (A.3)












We use Similarity also known as Cosine Similarity. This is a measure for narrative dis-
closure introduced by Brown and Tucker (2011).











v1 is the vector for document 1 and v2 is the vector for document 2.
θ is the angle between v1 and v2
‖v1‖ and ‖v2‖ are the vector length of v1 and v2 respectively
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Similarity is bounded between 0 and 1, with a higher score indicating more similarity.
Readablity:
We use the FLesch-Szigriszt Readability Index (IFSZ) for Spanish texts proposed by
Szigriszt (1993).





The score is bounded between 0 and 100, where a value between 0-50 indicates that the
text is difficult; between 55-65 is normal and a score higher than 70 indicates that the text
is easy.
S it the total number of syllables, P the total number of words and F the total number of
phrases.
Positive and Negative Tones:
We use the positive and negative dictionaries for Spanish proposed by González et al.
(2019). The procedure is to search inside the document for a list of words “bags of
words” that are likely to be associated with positive and negative language.






wt f .id fi j (A.8)
Where, a is the total number of words in document i, wt f .id fi j is the weight of each term
in the document and J is the total number of words.
Length:
This is a textual measure that is built from the word count of a text.
Length = Length(Text) (A.9)
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